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Research on organization slack has focused mainly on Its effect in large publicly traded 
firms, but little work exists on the value of slack resources for other firms. Therefore, here, 
we address the question: Do slack resources matter in the case of Initial public offerings 
(IPOs)? We argue that firms that possess financial, innovational, and managerial slack 
resources are sending a positive signal to potential investors regarding the quality of the 
IPO. Using a sample of high-tech IPOs, we find support for that contention. 
Introduction 
In established firms. it has been found that slack resources act as incentives to 
experiment and make proactive strategic choices (George, 2005). they are deployed to 
build capabilities that make firms competitive, tbey help maintain coalitions that ensure 
the convergence of personal and organizational goals. and they act as buffers in periods 
of economic duress (George). We argue that excess or "slack" resolln;es possessed 
by firms undergoing an initial public offering (IPO) can signal the future potential of 
that firm and the quality of the investment. From a resource-based perspective, slack 
resources can provide a competitive advantage to new firms and. therefore, offer a 
promise of superior financial performance. Because new firms have not yet demonstrated 
the ability to sllccessfully handle the demands of public trading (e.g., market fluctua­
tions). they are discounted by investors (Certo. 2003). Slack resources may compen­
sate for this "Iiability of market newness" by reducing the risk of investment for the 
purchasers of the IPO. 
The main reasons why finns undertake IPO, are twofold: needing capital to bring an 
invention to market. or the owners. or venture capitalists. wanting to be able to realize 
tinancial gains. In the case of the latter. investors will only bc interested in making a 
financial commitment if the business has the potential for generating capital gains in 
stock. which. again, means bringing a viable invention to market Of capitalizing on an 
existing invention. That requires having operational abilities. the ability to innovate or 
generate subsequent innovations, and managers to formulate strategy and implement 
Please send corrcsponth:n..:e to: Fariss~Tcn:v MUll"';], tel.: (5401 568~3237: e-mail: i1l1)usafx{£Djmu,cdu and to 
Richard Reed at r.fccd68(£l1csuohio.edu. 
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suppoI1ing tactics. Therefore. this research focuses on three types of slack resources that 
are particularly relevant to firms that are going through an IPO. Like most work on slack, 
we use financial slack as an independent variable. We also develop two measures of 
slack that are new: innovation slack-the reason most new firms emerge-and mana­
gerial slack, which reflects Penrose's (1959) original arguments on spare management 
capacity and its value in promoting firm growth. By examining all three types, this work 
provides a more complete understanding of the effects of slack resources on young 
organizations. 
Slack denotes the difference between a firm's current resources and the current 
resource demands on the linn (Mishina. Pollock. & Porae, 2004). Slack resources provide 
firms with the required flexibility to develop strategic options to pursue opportunities 
(Greenley & Oktemgil, 1998). They also can be diverted or redeployed to achieve orga­
nizational goals (George. 2005). Slack ha~ been used to explain diverse organizational 
phenomena including performance. innovation. goal conflict. effectiveness, and political 
behavior, and these resources differ in both type (e.g .. financial or social capital) and form 
(c.g.. absorbed or unahsorbed). As already noted, studies of organizational slack typically 
have focused on large publicly traded firms. which arc dealing with very different issues 
to nascent 11rms. Verv little attention has been given in the literature to the effect of ~ -
organizational slack on the performance of these younger firms. 
In business, we llsually address risk in terms of managerial risk, or income stream 
uncertainty tef. Palmer & Wiseman. 1999). but a third conceptualization of risk. which is 
implicit in these other definitions. is explained as probability x consequence (Reed. 
Lemak. & Hesser, 1997). This latter conceptualization of risk has utility in model building 
(Storrucl-Barnes. Reeel. & Jessup, 20 I 0). Here. probabi lity and consequence refer to the 
probability of an investor losing their investment in an IPO flnn. In larger. established 
f1rms. the implicit question that has always shadowed work on slack is whether or not an 
agency issue exists as managers try to reduce risk to their employment capital by holding 
slack as a cushion against a downturn in performance (e.g., Bourgeois, 1981: Nohria & 
Gulati. 1995, 1996). In established f1rms, managers keep their jobs and stockholders keep 
most or all of their investment. For new firms. the issue is different. Slack resources reduce 
the probability that the firm will fail. which means that for a given level of return, investors 
will be willing to pay a premium at the time of the IPO. In new firms, not only do slack 
resources increase the upside potential of being able to capitalize on opportunities. they 
also reduce downside risk for investors. 
This work contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we propose that slack 
resources represent important information for IPO investors; slack resources act as a 
quality signal. It thus provides insight into the value investors place on slack resources. 
Second, it provides empirical support for the conceptual framework by drawing on a rich 
set of IPO data in the United States during the period of 2001-2009. Third, we extend 
organizational slack research by moving away from well-established organizations to 
study the effect of slack resources in IPO finns. Finally. this study extends knowledge on 
organizational slack by moving beyond the traditional emphasis on financial slack to 
include innovational and managerial slack. 
Theoretical Foundations and Literature Review 
Signaling Theory and IPO Firm Research 
Investors not only find it challenging (0 evaluate the overall quality of an IPO 
in terms of the potential returns that will be generated. there are also difficulties with 
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assessing risk, despite [he list of risks that have to be included in the published pro­
spectuses, Assessing risk is difficult because these new-[o-the-murket firms may have 
few or no revenues, and it may be difficult to accurately value their assets, To overcome 
such hurdles, investors seek nontraditional methods for making assessments of IPO 
quality, They rely on signals that can indicate the quality of the firm (Cerlo, 2003), Firms 
that afC able to signal high quality stand a better chance of raising the necessary capital 
through an IPO for commercialization of underlying technology and future growth 
(Deeds, DeCarolis, & Coombs, 1997: Stuart. Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Among other 
things. signaling mechanisms that are llsed by firms include the reputations of invest­
ment bankers (Carter. Dark, & Singh. 1998b). auditor,; (Beatty. 1989). and VCl1lurc 
capitalists (Megginson & Weiss. 1991). The t:1Ct that investment bankers avoid poor 
quality IPO Ilrms to protect their reputations is evidence of the credibility of this type of 
signal (Certo. 2003). According to market-signaling theory. certain variables or indica­
tors send signab to potential investors about the capabiliti(:s and, therefore, the future 
value of finns (Akerlof. 1970: Spellce. 1973). Signaling theory is useful in situations 
where information asymmetry is high (Spence) because, as Akerlof showed. in instances 
where buyers (for IPOs, read investors) cannot determine quality. they are reluctant to 
buy. and markets collapse. 
The literature on 11'0 signaling is extensive. For example, the board of directors can 
act as a signal to potential resource holders about the quality of a young firm (Certo. Daily. 
& Dalton, 200 I), especially given that investors value prestigious board structures, thus 
reducing the liability of newness and improving IPO firm stock performance (Ccrto. 
2003). Pollock. Chell. Jackson, and Hambrick (2010) found that prestigious affiliates 
(executives, directors. venture capitalists. ami underwriters) communicatc different 
signals of IPO worth. Other signals. for example. can indicate a top management team 
(TMT),s ability to manage the firm (Zimmerman, 2(08). Signals to investors also can be 
achieved through releasing informatioll on research and development (R&D) expendi­
tures. the history of technological performance. or the number of products brought to the 
market (Deeds el al.. 1997). Table I provides a summary of key literature Oil signaling 
in IPOs. 
Ndofor and Levitas (2004. p. 688) define signaling as "the conduct and observable 
attributes that alter the beliefs of. or convey information to. other individuals in the 
market about unohservable attributes and intentions." Where Ndofor and Levitas were 
concerned with both behavior and attributes. we arc concerned only with the latter. We 
are concerned with investors' ability to see information on slack resources and interpret 
it in terms of potential for future income and amelioration of investment risk. Thus. 
we draw on the essential principle of signaling theory: the signal must be observable 
(Spence. 1973) and known in advance (Certo. Daily, et al.. 2001: Janney & Folta. 20(H). 
Consistent with the logic of Ndofor and Lcvitas. !inns that signal the existence of slack 
resources are creating a "separating equilibrium" whereby investors are able to distin­
guish between firms with the potential f,)r growth and reduced risk and those that do uo! 
have the potential. or which carry higher risk. Given that money for investment in lPOs 
is not available in infinite alllounts. and that other firms Illay be doing an 11'0 at the saille 
time. it becomes a zero-sum game whereby olle firm is likely to win at another's expense. 
Firms that are endowed with slack resources will therefore make a point of signaling it 
to investors. whereas those that do not possess the slack will be unable to make that 
signal. 
Because resource information is included in the prospectus. slack resources arc 
known to investors in advance of the actual offering. Pinancial-slack information can 
be gathered from a firm's balance sheet. Information on other types of slack, such 
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Table I 
Signals Found to Influence IPO Performance 
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as managerial and innovational slack, also can be found in the prospectus. Managerial 
information can be found in the management section of the prospectus. Innovational­
slack information can be found both in the income statement (R&D spending) and in the 
business section (patent counls). 
Organization Slack 
Financial Slack Researchers have used financial slack in a number of different forms as 
a predictor of innovation (Nohria & Gulati. 1996), performance (Bromiley. 1991; Tan & 
Peng, 2003), and the firm' s ability to experiment (Wiseman & BromiIey, 1996). Financial 
slack refers to the level of assets available to an organization (e.g .. cash on hand) (Kraatz 
& Zajac, 2001) tilat can easily be deployed to varied uses (Mishina et aI., 2004). Financial 
slack is the least absorbed form of slack, especially given that it is completely divisible 
for the allocation of multiple activities (Greve, 2003). The existence of liquid financial 
resources in a firm indicates that the fjrm has resources in excess of what is required 
to meet current obligations and support current sales levels (Mishina et aLl. Financial 
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resources can be generated internally or externally. Internal resources are composed 
mainly of the profits from a firm's present investments. Those raised externally are 
acquired through capital markets or financial institutions and can be used for future 
investment. These financial resourccs can be used to purchase equipment. employ scien­
tists. build new laboratories. invest in new buildings. hire sales people. invest in R&D, and 
improve marketing. Financial resources thus offer [0 finns a high level of transferability 
to profit-yielding activities (Amit & Schoemaker. 1993). Although financial resources are 
not rare or unique. they are essential and do offer a competitive advantage to firms that 
possess them (Latham & Braun. 2008). Their existence in new firms can lead to superior 
financial performance and. thus, better IPO valuations. 
Some scholars have argued that slack may be advantageous only up to a ce11ain 
point (Bourgeois, 1981: Nohria & Gulati, 1995, 1996; Tan & Pcng, 2003) because 
Bourgeois's original thinking on the topic linked organizational inefficiency to slack. He 
argued that inefficiency is a natural outcome of high levels of slack within an organi­
zation. This may be true in weil-established. publicly traded Ilrms. We argue that IPO 
finns do not have the luxury of being seell as inefficiellt. given the high scrutiny they 
face when going public. However. firm valuation may depend 011 whether a firm will 
have the resources necessary to successfully navigate the IPO process. In this case. 
slack would ease capital restrictions and improve the strategic choices of managers for 
investments with positive performance implications (George, 20(5). Also, it allows flex­
ibility and experimentation. which can have positive performance effects (George). 
Bourgeois fllliher suggested that slack gives decision makers the freedom to make deci­
siclIIs with little information. and that. when necessary, it may give an organization the 
time needed 10 collect additional information. In view of these arguments. we propose 
that higher levels of financial slack are positively related to firm valuation at IPO. The 
higher the level of linancial slack. the stronger and more apparent is the quality signal 
to investors. 
Using precedent (e.g .. Mishina et al.. 2004; Voss, Sirdeshl11ukh, & Voss, 2(08). ami 
building on the view that slack resources should be considered as excess resources rather 
than just total resources (Moses. 1992). we explore the effects of two different types of 
financial slack (cash reserves and working capital). Cash reserves represent the level of 
available cash (cash on hand) to an organization (Kraatz & Zajac. 20(1). For investors. 
slack resources in the form of cash. which is the nearest of financial resources and the 
most fungible, sends a strong signal. If the tirm has sales, then it signals upside potential 
in the form of positive cash flow and an ability to generate more cash. In terms of the 
dowllside. regardless of whether or not the linn has sales. it signals protection against 
failure and bankruptcy. The more cash a firm has, then the more positive the signal. 
Working capital is different. It is the difference between current assets and current 
liabilities. and it captures the use of current resources relative to activity (Bourgeois & 
Singh, 1983). II portrays information OJ] the assets required to maintain day-to-day 
operations. and includes things like inventory needed for operations and excess of 
accollnts receivable over accounts payable. again. relative to the level of activity (Moses). 
Working capital is a resource that is neither a near resource (easily turned into cash), 
particularly in young finns without the leverage to collect bills or with invcntory of a new 
or unproven technology. nor is it particularly fungible. That means that the greater the 
amount of working capital required to maintain day-tcH!ay operations, the greater the risk 
for investors. Firms that can operate with less working capital should be able to attract an 
investment premium over those that require more working capital. 
Details Oil approaches lIsed to measure cash reserves and working capital are 
described in the Method, section. [n the interim. it can he stated that: 
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Hypothesis la: There is a positive linear relationship between cash reserves and IPO 
valuation. 
Hypothesis Ib: There is a negative linear relationship between working capital and 
IPO valuation. 
Innovational Slack. Our interest lies specifically with the slack useful for generating 
innovations. which will be called in this paper "innovational slack." Innovational slack 
refers to the stock of resources available to an organization such as underused R&D 
facilities. specialized development staff. and time for development activities. Managers 
call allocate a certain amount of time for product developers to work on their own 
projects and loosen performance standards for new projects (Jelinek & Schoonhoven. 
1990). Overall. then. innovational slack can be viewed as a refinement to existing 
organizational-slack theory. In this work. we view innovational slack as excess ullused 
intellectual property and above-industry-average R&D spending. We suggest that 
firms may have two different types of innovational slack: inputs into the innovation 
process (e.g .. R&D) and outputs (e.g .. patents). Both can be lIsed to create more inno­
vations through the application of new knowledge or by combining them with other 
knowledge. 
Proponents of slack argue that organizational slack plays a vital role in allowing 
innovation (Nohria & Gulati. 1995). Slack permits firms to more safely experiment with 
new strategies and innovative projects that lllost probably would not be approved in a more 
resource-constrained environment (Cyert & March, 196311992). Other researchers 
counter this argument, suggesting that slack diminishes incentives to innovate ancl pro­
motes undisciplined investment in R&D activities that rarely yield economic benefits 
(Leibenstein, 1969). To reconcile these differences. Nohria ancl Gulati (1995. 1996) 
hypothesized and demonstrated that the actual relationship between slack and innovation 
is curvilinear (an inverse U-shape). Pcr that inverted-U argument on slack. it can be argued 
that too much slack before the IPO implies that such firms will face diminishing disci­
pline. As slack increases, the discipline that is exercised in the selection, ongoing support. 
and termination of projects becomes lax (Jensen, 1993: Leibenstein: Nohria & Gulati. 
1996). For example. over time, and with increasing slack, risky projects with negative net 
present value may be funded simply because the resources exist to indulge agents for 
whom these are pet projects (Nohria & Gulati). Escalation of commitment also becomes 
an issue given that excess levels of slack make it difficult to terminatc someone' s pet 
project (Staw, Sandelands. & Dutton, 1981). Therefore, it can be argued that innovational 
slack fosters an X-inefficient (Leibenstein. 19(6) atmosphere around resource allocation 
that increases both the risk that poor projects will be continued even in the face of negative 
information and that projects will he abandoned simply because someone ran out of 
energy. became bored. or ran into a tough problem (Nohria & Gulati. 1996). Based OIl 
these arguments we propose that innovational slack would have a positive effect on IPO 
valuations up to a certain point. but, after that point. slack can indicate future inefficiency 
ancI will have a negative effect. 
The relative amount of R&D spending has heen used as an indicator of innovative 
activity (Scherer, 1980), and a number of studies have considered the relationship between 
R&D spending, productivity returns. and linn performance (Comanor, 1965: Grabowski 
& Vernon, 1990: Graves & Langowitz. 1993). As the majority of the work in this area 
notes, there are strong industry norms associated with R&D spending. We therefore 
hypothesize that. relative to the industry. R&D spending will he associated with gains in 
[PO value but. after a certain point, investors will interpret the spending as indicative of 
inefficiency. and the effect will be negative. 
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Patents also are widely used as indicators of innovation activity and essential tech­
nology positions (Deeds et aI., 1997, p. 37), and arc widely accepted measures used by 
policy makers. analysts (Van del' Eerden & Saelens, 1991), and researchers (Deeds et al.). 
Patents provide inventors with protection in the form of a finite-life monopoly for their 
intellectual property. Governments are willing to issue patents to inventors in return for the 
greater good to society or economic progress. but issuing patents is an effective way to 
remove barriers to informatioll asymmetry. As Long (2002) indicated. a downside to 
providing the information in a patent means that competitors may be able to quickly 
circumvent critical aspects of an invention and effectively appropriate some of the pat­
entee's rents. The solution to that problem is to patent and protect information for core 
markets and related technologies by creating impenetrable patent fences, which allow the 
patent holder to exploit a technology and appropriate relums by blocking existing and new 
competitors (Reitzig. 2004). The creation of fences involves what is referred to as patent 
rafting or bulking, which simply means that a large number of patents are created around 
the core technology and related technologies. The process can be expensive. Firms not 
only have to apply for the patents but also have (0 maintain the patents through renewal, 
up to three limes during the life of the patent in the United States. with increasing fees 
for eacb renewal (Malewicki & Sivukumar, 2004 J. After the patents have been issued. 
they then have to be defended against infringement (Long). As explained by Grady, 
Alexander, Martin, and Merges (1992), to make defense worthwhile, the benefits of
- . 
protecting the technology have to be significant. In addition to the costs of application and 
renewal, there are also the costs of time (patent-infringement monitoring). legal costs. and 
emotional and time costs of defense. As Somaya (2003, p. 24) explained in his research 
on patent litigation in the computers and research-medicine industries. defense can be 
expensive, not only in terms of direct legal costs but also because it absorbs "the time 
of key managers. lawyers. engineers, and scientists in the company." As the number of 
patents held inereases. so too do defense costs. Like research and development (R&D) 
spending, we predict that the relationship between patenting and IPO value will be an 
inverted-U shape with firms preferring mid levels of patent slack. 
Hypothesis 2a: There i, an inverted U-shaped relationship between R&D slack aud 
IPO valuation, with the best 1PO valuations occurring at an intermediate level of R&D 
slack. 
Hypothesis 2b: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between patent slack and 
[PO valuation, with (he best 11'0 valuations occurring at intermediate levels of patent 
slack. 
Mallagerial Slack. After IPO. the top management team must learn to deal with reduced 
flexibility in managerial discretion. increased oversight from the lirm's board of directors 
and blockholders, greater demands from investors for short-term performance, and less 
tolerance of negative press and performance volatility (PriceWaterhotlse, 1995). The TMT 
must deal with significant cultural changes, as well as change resulting from its employ­
ees' neVi-found wealth as options are exercised anti stock is sold, which can lead to some 
employees leaving the company and some others become less willing to make the 
personal sacrifices that were required to get the firm to the IPO stage (Fischer & Pollock, 
2004). All of this means that executives are managing the upheaval caused by the IPO 
while trying to manage growth and plan for the future. Penrose (1959) recognized the 
importance of managerial slack as an essential factor in linn growth. She observed that 
finns are able to grow and develop only when excess "managerial services" are released 
to allow managers to plan and direct growth. She also pointed out that newer IlnllS are 
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faced with numerous difficulties and that focusing on growth while managing those 
difficulties is extremely challenging (Penrose). The notion of having above-average mana­
gerial resources and experience at the time of the IPO is our conceptualization of 
managerial slack. That means not only having a sufficient nnmber of managers but 
also having managers with industry experience. Managers' experience with firm-level 
resources produces firm-specific knowledge about the productive opportunities available 
to the linn (Penrose). Penrose further observed that this experience-based knowledge 
is proprietary because it cannot rapidly be transferred to new managers. nor can it be 
purchased in the market. She also emphasized that managers cannot function well as a 
team without firm-specific. shared experience in the TMT. which leads to the creation of 
wcit knOWledge. In short. managerial expertise is a resource that is valuable. rare. and 
difficultlo imitate. 
Along with Penrose (1959). other researchers have argued that managers playa vital 
role in choosing a firm' s direction. the markets it will participate in. and the blend of 
resources it will deploy and nurture (Castanias & Helfat. 199]; Kor & Mahoney. 2000; 
Mahoney & Pandian. 1992). An important insight frol11 the resource-based view shows 
that to generate superior returns. a fim] must not only possess unique resources but also 
effectively and innovatively manage such resources (Mahoney. 1995). In pm1icular. lhe 
bundle of managerial experiences can reflect the TMT's skills. knowledge. and compe­
tencies (Carpenter. Sanders. & Gregersen. 2001; Harris & Helfat. 1997). To assess mana­
geJial competence at the upper ranks. an examination of the bundle of experiences in the 
TMT is essential. especially because professional management experience molds the 
knowledge. confidence. and imagination of mangers (Penrose: Van de Ven. Hudson. & 
Schroeder. 1984). 
Clearly. managers as a resource are crucial for survival and success. On the one the 
hand. with too few managers. the probability of failure increases. On the other hand. too 
many managers also create problems. Too many managers not only raises costs in terms 
of managerial salaries. benefits. and perquisites. but it will also likely lead to a prolifera­
tion of organizational policies. procedures. and red tape as managers justify their existence 
and salaries. Again. in Leibenstein's (1966. 19(9) terms. firms with too many managers 
suffer from X-inefficiency. Thus. in terms of managerial slack. we postulate that Nohria 
and Gulati's (1995. 1996) curvilinear view of slack will hold. We also postulate that it 
applies to our second measure of slack: managers' industry experience. Experience slack 
is aimed at capturing the managerial knowledge of the opportunities. threats. competition. 
and technologies (Kor. 2003) of an industry that also is important for survival and success. 
Several studies have shown that a significant amount of comlllonality characterizes the 
perceptions of managers operating within the same industry. In particular. strategic and 
environmental information drawn from intra-industry sources bear a marked similarity to 
lOp managers' own knowledge and perceptions of the environment and opportunities 
within it. Spender (1989). labeling these common views "shared recipes." suggested that 
they emerge as a function of managers' similar experiences amassed through industry 
tenure. Earlier. Hambrick (1982) had noted a comparable homogeneity in views fostered 
by top managers' reliance on common sources of industry informatioll. Industry-specillc 
experience helps top managers intensify their knowledge of competitive conditions and 
specific technologies in the industry. However. as that knowledge increases. it can change 
from being a valuable resource to being a core rigidity as managers fall prey to the 
insidious nature of dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis. 1986). Thus. too little industry 
knowledge can be a bad thing. as can too much. 
Traditionally. the TMT has been defined as lop-level executives such as the chief 
executive officer (CEO). chief operating officer. business unit heads. and vice presidents 
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(Carpenter et aI., 2001; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), Specifically in the IPO literature, 
researchers have considered all inside executives listed in the prospectlls as kcy manage­
ment personnel (e.g., Kor. 2003). This work follows that convention when assessing 
managerial slack. 
Hypothesis 3a: There is an inverted U-shapcd relationship between the number of 

insiders' slack and the IPO value. with the best IPO valuations occurring at an inter­

mediate level of number of insiders' slack. 

H)'pothesis 3b: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between insiders' industry 

experience slack and IPO value. with the best IPO valuations occurring at an inter­





To test the hypotheses. we developed a sample fnlm all U.S. high-tech flrms that had 
undertaken an IPO between 200 I and 2009. High-tech firms were selected to allow us 
to more easily test the hypothesis on innovational slack. Based OIl Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. flrms were identified as operating in high-technology sectors 
(Daily. Certo, & Daltoll, 2005). High-technology lirms are dell ned as those in SIC codes 
28 (biotechnology and drugs). 35 (computer and related). 38 (medical equipment). 73 
(software). 36 (electronics and communication), and 48 (telephone equipment and com­
munications services) (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Loughran & Ritter. 2004). Consistent 
with prior research in the fleld, holding companies, financial institutions, and real estate 
investment trusts were excluded from the sample (e.g., Fischer & Pollock, 2004). The data 
were collected from the prospectuses found on the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval system for IPOs. The final sample included 299 
firms. 
Measures 
Dependent Variable, IPO value. which is also known as IPO proceeds raised. represents 
the capital raised and transferred to the linn and its owners at IPO. It is measured as the 
total value of the capital raised (the offer price x the number of shares sold in the 
offering) minus the underwriters' fees as presented on the cover page of the I1rm' s 
prospectus (Deeds et al.. 1997; Finkle. J998: Gulati & i-Jiggins. 2003: Zimmerman. 
2008). The importance of a venture being able to issue an [PO is extremely important 
because it captures the amouIlt of capital that an IPO flrm can truly lise (Deeds et al.). 
Therefore. the point at which these ventures decide to undergo an IPO represents a rare 
opportunity to measure their performance up to that point (DeCarolis & Deeds. 1999). 
Ccrto. Holcomb. and Holmes (2009) have further suggested that this measure is both 
a measure of Ilrm IPO performance (Gulati & Higgins: Zimmerman) and a measure 
of how the market values a company at the time of the initial offering (Deeds. Mang. & 
Frandsen. 2004: Finkle). 
Indepelldent Variables. There is considerable variety in industry context in the sample, 
and it is possible that slack may differ across industries (George. 20(5). For instance. 
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Miller. Lant. Milliken. and Korn (1996) illustrated that slack correlates differently with 
perfonnance in the furniture versus software industries. And because slack is operation­
ally defined as excess absolute levels of resources (Nohria & Gulati. 1996). we chose to 
calculate slack as the deviation from the mean of each of the six industries in the sample 
(e.g.. George). [n IPO research. carc is taken to ensure that sample firms are compared 
with representative sets. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) and Brau. Brown, and 
Osteryoung (2004) compared their samples of IPO firms with industry "peers." while 
Arend (2003) did a dyadic comparison of IPOs with other within-industry IPOs, and 
MacGregor. Slovic. Dreman. and Berry (2000) split their sample around intra-industry 
IPO means. Given that we include all IPO firms within our selected industries. we have 
calculated slack as the deviation from the within-industry. IPO-firm mean. 
We also need to note that financial ratios that arc widely used in the literature may 
differ from one industry to another. Ratios that are the norm in one industry could be 
extraordinarily high or low in another industry, and thus slack measures may not gener­
alize across industries (Miller & Leihlein. 1996). Lev ( 1969) argued that average industry 
financial ratios offer reasonable proxies for target levels. Therefore, we measured all slack 
resources as the difference of a firm's own measures (e.g .. accounting ratios) and its 
industry average. We only utilized firms in our sample to create the industry averages 
given the uniqueness of IPOs. We believe that the closest comparable group with any IPO 
firm would be similar finns that are in the saIlle industry that also are in the process of 
going public. 
Cash reser!'es represent the level of available cash (cash on hand) to an organization 
(Kraatz & Zajac. 200 I). These are available for deployment for virtually any purpose. This 
measure of financial slack is consistent with those adopted in other studies (e.g .. George, 
2005: Miller & Leiblein. 1996; Voss et aI., 2(08). Firm cash slack was calculated w;ing the 
following: 
Cash slack =(firm cash reserves) - (average industry cash reserves) 
As already noted. lI'orking ('{[pital was chosen because it has been identified by 
scholars as an appropriate and useful operationalization of !1nancial slack. given that it 
considers the (appropriate) level of working capital to meet current needs (Mishina et a!., 
2004; Moses. 1992). Working capital is calculated by taking the difference between a 
firm'.s current assets (e.g .. cash and ca,h equivalents, accounts receivable, inventory. and 
marketable securities) and a firm's current liabilities (e.g .. accounts payable and accrued 
expenses) (Brealey & Myers, 1996). The amount that is left after subtracting current 
liabilities from current assets is a measure of short-term financial resource utilization 
(Bromiley, 1991; March & Shapira, 1987). We measured it as follows: 
Working capital slack = (finn working capital) - (average industry working capital). 
These measures are also similar to the conceptualization advanced by Singh (1986) in 
regard to the two-component concept of slack where he measured absorbed and unah­
sorbed slack using cash and working capital. There are. of COHrse. several measures or 
tlnancial slack such as the three-componenL-based concept developed by Bourgeois and 
Singh (1983) where slack was measured using available slack (which might be equated to, 
say. cash). potential slack (a finn's equity-to-debt ratio). and recoverable (or absorbed) 
slack (which was measured using selling, general and administrative expenses divided 
by flrm sales) (Bromiley, 1991). We chose not to calculate slack with three components 
(e.g .. Bromiley) given the diff]culty in reliably using ratios slich as equity to debt for firms 
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that are going through an IPO. The debt to equity calculation does not work because. of 
course. the equity is arriving via the dependent variable. JPO value. Also. most of these 
young high-tech firms possibly will have little or no equity while having a lot of debt. 
Additionally. the equity S!llIcture might not really be well-known at the point of IPO. 
Both R&D spending (input flows to the innovation process) and patents (stocks of 
output of research) are indicators of firm innovation. Traditionally. the relative amount 
of R&D spending has been used as an indicator of innovative activity (Scherer. 1980). All 
else being equal. if Ilnns spend more on R&D than the industry average. there is a higher 
probability of them having slack intellectual property than if they spent less than the 
induslry average. This variable is based on the R&D-intensity variable that typically has 
been calculated as the level of investments divided by the firm's sales. assets. or number 
of employees (e.g., Deeds, DeCarolis. & Coombs. 1998; Eltlic, 1998). In this study. R&D 
investments are standardized by total assets because many IPO firms do not have sales 
because they are still ill the carly years ofproduct developmcnt(Deeds et al.; Kor. 20(6). We 
used the last audited year of R&D spending as provided in the prospect liS of the IPO firm. 
R&D investment slack = (firm R&D/firm assets) - (average industry R&D/ 
average industry assets). 
The second innovational-slack measure is palelll illlensity slack. Patents arc eonsid­
ered indicators of vital technology positions and inllovative activity (Ashton & Sen. 1988). 
According to Deeds et al. (1998). a firm's patent stock is an indication of the size of a 
linn's stoek of intellectual property. and thus research productivity. Patent intensity slack 
was measured using the following equation; 
Patent inten,dty slack", (number of linn patents! firm assets)­
(average industry patents/average industry assets). 
A1allageria/ slack was defined earlier in the sludy as those excess managerial skills and 
I!xperiences that hdp the firlll to grow and. also as previously noted. in the JPO literalllrc. 
researchers have considered all inside exeeutives I isted in the prospectus as key manage­
ment personnel (e.g .. Kor. 2(03). Therefore, this work also lIses the number of all insiders: 
Insider slack", (number of firm TMTjfirm assets) 
(average industry TMT/avcrage industry assets). 
To caplllre a different dimension of managerial slack. we measured experience 
slack-the industry experience of the TMT. Based on Kor (2003). we measured this 
variable as the average number of managerial positions held in the same industry by 
managers in the firm compared with the average industry TMT positions held. This 
measure captures the breadth of industry-specifIc experience possessed by the managers 
(Kor). and similar to the first measure. it assumes that firms with more managers with 
industry experience will have more experience slack to draw upon. Also. because the size 
of TMTs differ from one company to the other, taking the Ilumber of positions held 
relative to the average number of the TMT will control for the size of 1he flrl11. Thus: 
Experience slack 
'" (average firm TMT positions/lotal number of linn insiders)­
(average industry TMT positions/average number of indust!'y insiders). 
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Control Variables 
Per the precedent established in other IPO studies, we controlled for firm age 
(e.g., Beatty, 1989; Beatty & Zajac. 1994; Finkle, J998). which we measured as years 
from founding (e.g., Zimmerman, 2008). It was employed as a control variable in this 
work because older firms, both prior to and following the IPO, have been found to 
financially outperform younger firms (Ceno. Covin. Daily, & Dalton. 2001; Ritter. 
1998). Also. firms with longer track records are known to have a greater chance of 
survival (e.g., Fischer & Pollock, 20(4). The reputation of the Ululenvriler can impact 
investors' perceptions of IPO firm quality (Beatty & Ritter; Carter et al.. 1998b; Carter 
& Manaster, 1990). We coded this variable from Jay Ritter's personal website at the 
University of Florida (where all underwriter reputation rankings are available) and it is 
based on the methodology employed by Carter and Manaster and Carter, Dark, and 
Singh. We also controlled for founder efrects because founders may affect the survival 
and performance of new ventures (Cerlo, Covin. et aI.. 2001; Nelson. 20(3). We llsed a 
dummy variable to opermiollalize founder on the board (I =founder, 0 =nonfoullder) 
(e.g.. Arthurs et al.. 20(9). Number of risk factors are included because higher risk 
may increase underpricing and could influence performance. Certo, Covin. et al. (200 [. 
p. 650) write that "risk factors associated with a finn can affect both perfommnce 
expectations and realized performance." Therefore. a 11rm's risk position was operation­
alized as the number of risk factors as reported in the prospeclUs (Beatty & Zajac; 
Welbourne & Andrews. 1996). 
Equity raised or the percentage of equity offered in the IPO was measured as the ratio 
of total shares offered to total shares outstanding (l\1udambi & Zimmerman. 2005). It is 
important to control for this variable since the amount of capital raised at IPO might be a 
function of the percentage of equity the company t10ats at IPO (Zimmerman. 2(08). Serial 
.!iJ/lilder counted the number of other finns founded by TMT members as listed in the 
prospectus. IPO firms that had one or more top managers with experience in founding 
other companies were coded "I," while firms without such experience were coded "0:' 
Typically. venture capitalists have a very positive outlook toward previolls experience in 
founding other finllS (Wright. Robbie. & Ennew. 1997). 
A high volume of IPO activity usually characterizes hot markets (Ibbotson & Jaffe. 
1975). During such a period. the number of firms that undergo an IPO and the average 
value of the [POs brought to market is considerably higher than during a normal period 
(DeCarolis & Deeds. J999; Ritter, 1989). Our data showed that 2004, 2005, 2006. and 
2007 all had the characteristics of a hot market. IPOs during the hot market years were 
coded "I." while all others were coded "0." 
Generated slack generally denotes available resources for developing strategy options 
for future l1exibility and was measured as sales per employee (Chakravarthy. 1986). More 
specifically, this ratio refers to the ability to attain surplus revenue from employees. and 
therefore the higher the ratio, the higher the resources available for future flexibility 
(Greenley & Oktemgil, 1998). fm'ested slack was measured using R&D by sales ratio 
(Chakravarthy) and generally represents deployed resources, which could reduce the 
opportunity to develop strategy options for future flexibility. We controlled for both of 
these slack measures given that some previous research has shown that excellent firms are 
better at managing their slack resources (Chakravarthv) and that some slack studies found 
~ ~ J 
a positive relationship between slack and performance (e.g .. Bromiley. J991; Miller & 
Leiblein. 1996). 
We controlled for prior sales. If a J1rm has sales, then investors consider a firm's 
revenue track record before the IPO (Zimmerman, 2(08). Prior sales were measured using 
the towl revenue as reported in the prospectus in each firm's income statement. This 
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measure could also impact the amount of slack a firm has for a particular year given that 
the budgeting process will depend. in pan. on prior sales. We also controlled for the 
possible effects of venture-capital backing (Ve-backing) (e.g.• Certo. Daily. et al.. 2001: 
Megginson & Weiss. 1991). This variable has shown to influence the ability of an IPO 
finn to raise capital (Brav & Gompers. 2003: Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Megginson & 
Weiss). increase chances of survival (Khurshed, 2000). and influence the amount of slack 
resources a tinn has (Macmillan. Kulow. & Khoylian. 1989). Firms backed by venture 
capitalists were calculated as a dichotomous measure coded I for VC-backing. 0 if not. 
Retum Oil (Isseis (ROM was measured in the year prior to IPO (Miehaely & Shaw. 1994). 
We controlled for ROA given that profitability is an "obvious determinant" of finns' slack 
resources (Chakravarthy. 1986). We controlled for jirm si:e given that prior research has 
shown that larger IPO firms tend to outperform smaller ones in terms of stock appreciation 
(e.g.. Megginson & Weiss: Mikkelsoll. Partch. &. Shah. 1997). We used log of empJoyees 
to control for size (e.g .. Deeds et al.. 1997). Finally, we <.:O!l!rolled for pril'llfe jii/ill/cillg 
that IPO firms had received before going public to control for previous success in securing 
financial capital (c.g .. Gulati & Higgins: Stuart &. Sorenson. 2003).' 
Results 
We used partial hierarchical Illultiple regression to examine the hypotheses. Table 2 
presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for all variables. Overall, the 
correlations are low to intermediate. Patent slack is positively cOiTelated with R&D 
slack. a result that is not surprising because any firm that invests heavily in research 
would also want to protect any innovations that might be found during the process. Thus. 
it is logical that as the commitment to R&D increases. so would the number of patents 
owned by the finn. The number-of-managers slack is negatively correlated with firm size 
in our dataset and positively correlated to cash slack, suggesting that a control for firm 
size is important for measuring the effect of managerial slack and tlnancial slack. Patent 
and R&D slack also were positively correlated to managerial slack. However. because 
the variance inflation factors (VIF) for these terms are below 3.4. which is well below 
the VIF of I() that Kenlledy advocates is indicative of "harmful collinearity" (Kennedy, 
1992. p. 183). it is unlikely that this correlatioll will confound the results of any statis­
tical tests.' We examined the VIF for all models: nOlle were close to the coml11only 
accepted threshold of 10 (Cryer & Miller. 1991: Neter. Wasserman. & Kutner, 1985). 
The VIF values ruled out the possibility that multicollinearity and the instability of band 
beta were a serious problem. 
Table 3 displays the results for the regressions. The base model had five significant 
results: serial founder, prior sales. VC backing. firm size. and private financing. Prior 
sales. finn size. and private financing all had a positive relationship with IPO value. while 
serial founder and VC backing had a negative one. Model 2 shows that the additional 
variables contribute significantly to our understanding of the amount of capital raised 
through 11'0 beyond the control variables (change in R' '" 0.335). Cash reserves was 
positively and significantly related to the size of the IPO valuation while working capital 
was negatively and significalllly related (0 IPO valuation. thus providing strong support 
for hypotheses I a and lb. 
1. \Ve wb.h to thank the anonymous reviewers for this ~ugge\tion, and for other valuabl:2' in~ights, 
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N::: 299. StandarJilCG 1..'{wfikiC'nts rCfk1r!c-d {two-taik-d t6{S}, 
-P < 0, 10: '* p < OJ}S: p < (lUI: +N f1 <: OJ}(H 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b predicted a nonlinear !inverted U-shaped and U-shapcd, res­
pectively) relationship between innovational slack and IPQ value, The coefficient for the 
R&D-slack squared term is negative and significant, providing support for hypothesis 2a, 
and the coefficient for the patent-slack squared term interestingly is positive and signifi­
cant, which is opposite to what we expected. The linear terms for both innovational­
slack variables were significanl. Hypothesis 3a and 3b predicted all invcJ1ed U-shaped 
relationship between managerial slack and IPQ value. The results show that contrary to 
OUl' expectations, the coefficient for insider slack squared term is positive and significant. 
The squared term coefficient of industry-expericncc slack was negative but not significant. 
The number of insiders slack linear term was negative and significant while the linear term 
for experience slack was not significant. 
Further, we performed additional analyses to evaluate whether the results indicate 
robust relationships in the data. First, we reran the same regression equations used to test 
the hypotheses with 25'10 of the sample randomly deleted from the data set. The results 
1137 
were identical to the ones presented in our model utilizing 100% of the data except for 
hypothesis 2 that lost some significance (from p < 0.001 to p < 0,0]). Second, 50% of the 
sample were randomly deleted from our data set. This time, the model retained support for 
all hypotheses except hypothesis 2 that lost all support. Overall then, it is reasonable to 
suggest that our findings seem robust and stable. Further, our results show that they are not 
spurious but instead they reveal a distinct structure within the data that is supportive of our 
hypotheses. 
Discussion 
We found financial slack, specifically cash reserves, to be positively and significantly 
related to the capital raised through an IPO. The results suggest that financial slack may 
provide a signal to investors about the quality of the finn and its future performance 
potential. A strong financial position supports future growth because. as Penrose (1959) 
explained. a firm's future strategies are mainly determined by its current portfolio of 
resources. particularly by its financial resources. Additionally, firms with financial slack 
can be sending a signal about their ability to respond to shifting environmental demands 
(Cheng & Kesner, 1997). Bromiley (1991) reasoned that financial slack provides firms 
with the ability to smooth over short-term disturbances in the environment and, thus, build 
and maintain competitive advantage. These jindings arc also interesting given the com­
monly held view that financial slack could imply the existence of excess resources that are 
not being used for productive purposes (Mishina et al.. 2004) and that it could lead to 
inefticiency and nonoptirnizing behavior (Bourgeois, 198 I; Simon. 1957). However. we 
sec it as a matter of context, where potential investors seem to perceive financial slack as 
a positive-given the high demands of undertaking an IPO-not a negative. Therefore, ill 
the case of high-tech firms that arc planning to undertake an IPO, a solid financial position 
seems extremely important to reduce the unccnainty surrounding the firm in the eyes 
of investors. 
On the other ham!. as predicted. working capital slack was negatively related to IPO 
value. This result reveals that investors disapprove of tlrms with high levels of working 
capital slack. Such a signal can indicate that these young, untested firms have too many 
accounts receivables. carry a lot of inventory and, therefore, are inefficient and/oI' risky. 
Not being able to collect on receivables could, arguably, be expected from many of these 
young tlrrns. Small or new finns are seen as easy targets for tardy payers. Many of these 
high-tech industries can be characterized as being difficult to pioneer in. thus making it 
1110re difficult to sell the product once it is developed, and being high-tech. product 
complexity may require large numbers of expensive parts, thus increasing inventory costs 
and risk. Additionally. medical equipment or biotech industries are both industries that 
may have very high minimum-efficient scale, therefore making it difficult for these young 
companies that are trying to introduce new products into such an industry. Regardless of 
all these difficulties. slack in working capital denotes inefficiency and an increased risk 
of failure. 
Innovational slack was found to be significantly related to 11'0 value. R&D slack was 
found to have a negative coeftkient tinvcrted-U shaped), while, contrary to expectations, 
patent slack was found to have a positive coefficient relationship with 11'0 value 
(U-shaped). The finding for R&D slack is interesting insofar as it suggests that. up to a 
certain point, investors perceive R&D slack positively. For high-tech firms that want to 
have an IPQ, it seems safe to argue that above-average industry investments are expected. 
Investors want to see these firms invesling more than their peers, which might signal high 
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levels of commitment to innovation. Firms that arc not committed, or might have CEOs 
that are not committed, will be extremely reluctant to have slack in R&D at that stage. 
Even though R&D expenditures have been linked to an increase in market value (Chauvin 
& Hirschey. 1993; Doukas & Switzer, 1992). it appears that there is an optimal amount. 
Large R&D investments in IPO firms might signal high risk. For more established 
companies, above-industry-average investments in R&D might be expected. but in the 
case of !PO firms-given the uncertainty surrounding R&D investments and the useful­
ness of the outcomes-such investments may be a red flag and indicate that innovations 
are still 1:11' from being ready for cOlllmercialization. In the case of patent slack. we found 
that investors prefer new firms to have either low amounts or high amounts of patent slack. 
retlccting preference for either lIsing trade secrets or building patent fences. Thus. the key 
selling points for IPO firms is their innovation and their management. and innovation is 
best protected through trade secrets or by embracing the costs of patent defense. 
We found that managerial slack is signillcantly related to IPO valuations. However. 
contrary to our prediction, the number of managers slack squared terlll was positively and 
significantly associated (V-shaped) with raising funds through an IPO. It appears that 
investors either do not like slack (a lean TMT is better) or they like a large team with spare 
capacity. What is surprising, but perhaps should not be given Penrose's (1959) arguments, 
is the tinal part of that curvc. where investors value firms with high levels of managerial 
slack. We argued that the costs associated with having that many managers would affect 
an organization negatively. Investors though seem to feel that high levels of managerial 
slack might be an indication of managerial commitment to growth where these firms are 
accumulating the resources needed for such plans. Investors seem to be cautious of firms 
that have moderate levels of managerial slack and the potential for inefficiency. Finns 
that fall in the middle here might signal a lack of purpose since such moderate levels of 
managerial slack might not be sufficient for undertaking lame growth initiatives, such as 
~ ~ ~. ~ 
acquiring another firm (Brau & Fawcett. 2(06). Previous research shows that issuing linns 
try to enhance their image and attract investor attention by managing earnings before an 
IPO (Tcoh et aI., 19(8). and typically startup firms are known to add managers just before 
IPO, in the hopes of raising additional funds and, perhaps. to ease investors' concerns 
(Zimmerman. 2(08). 
Experience slack was 11m significant. Onc possible conclusion here could be that 
investors do not perceive excess managerial experience of TMT members at the time of 
the IPO as important as we theorized they would. Because industry-speeifk managerial 
experience can be obtained in the labor market and deployed in tlrms in the same industry. 
its value added may be low. and investors may view a certain level of experience as 
sufficient to undertake any challenge they face. Another possible conclusion might have 
had to do with the way we measured expeIience slack. This we discuss further in the 
limitations and future directions section. 
Implications 
The study makes a !lumber of contributions to the literature. It develops a causal logic 
for the impact of differcm forms of slack resources on IPO firm success. A.lso. we have 
introduced the concepts of innovational and managerial slack that capture an aspect of 
slack resources that has not been examined before, thereby extending our know!edge 
of organizational slack by moving beyond the traditional emphasis on financial slack. 
By examining all three (financial. innovation, and managerial), this work provides a 
more complete understanding of the effects of slack resources. George (2005) called 
for research to study slack in different contexts to help classify behavioral differences 
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between these firms. He believed that this would lead to a refinement of the logic of the 
slack-performance relationship. By focusing on IPO firms. this research helps to address 
this call. We argue, and our results appear to indicate, that resources can act as signals of 
quality, thus extending signaling theory in the IPO literature. 
Previous IPO-signaling research focused primarily on the extemal associations 
of a finn (e.g., underwriter reputation or VC backing) or fi11l1-specific characteristics 
(e.g., firm size or TMT composition). Megginson and Weiss ( 1991 ) found that because VC 
backing provides financial resources and expertise to a firm, it signals quality to investors. 
Financial and innovational slack also provide valuable signals. Higgins and Gulati (1006) 
showed that TMT composition can signal legitimacy in tenns of the ability of the TMT to 
fulfill critical roles, access resources. and attract endorsements from prestigious partners. 
As this work shows, also having the right numbers of managers also provides a signal for 
investors. Moderate levels. however. seem to send a negative signal to investors. possibly 
suggesting inefficiency or even window dressing. And high levels of slack seem to be 
perceived by investors as a sign that these firms have large growth aspirations possibly 
through acquisitions. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Because this study included a range of firms from different industries, the results 
can reasonably be generalized to different time peIiods and other industries. But there 
is the possibility that the unique characteristics of high-tech firms influenced the results. 
A focus on less technology-intensive IPO firms, or firms in more stable industries. 
might reveal additional insights into the way organizational slack influences IPO valu­
ations. Also, this study used secondary data: we relied on observable indicators. such 
as the number of managerial positions, to measure managerial-slack constructs that 
involve tacit, experiential knowledge. An in-depth study into the process mechanisms 
could explain the links between managerial slack and IPO value, and alternative 
methodologies, such as surveys, experiments, and simulations, may provide additional 
insights. 
For future research, other forms of financial. innovational. and managerial slack 
deserve to be examined. For example. tapping into managerial experience through the 
number of positions is a logical approach, with precedent (e.g., Kor. 2(03). Neverthe­
less, the way we measured this variable might have affected the results. Researchers still 
find numerous problems with identifying and quantifying specialized knowledge. For 
instance. it often only becomes obvious which knowledge was important for success 
long after the firm was established and has gone public. For example, with Apple, it 
appears that it was Steve Jobs's understanding of the humanization of technology that 
was important, rather thun any specific technical knowledge. Also, given that we are 
dealing with slack resonrces. that means that we have to be able to quantify the knowl­
edge either in absolute terms or relative to others in the field. Making that assessment 
requires being an expert in, or having access to someone who is an expert in, each 
manager's specialized knowledge. We see here a number of directions for future 
research. Some scholars might tinc! it rewarding to investigate better ways of eapturing 
this knowledge. Also. future research may address the question of if the value of past 
IPO experience is critical because entrepreneurial tlrms may avoid startup mistakes by 
hiring managers with this experience (Dyke. Fischer. & Reuber, 1992). Or managers' 
experience in related industries perhaps could be valuable to young lirllls, as could their 
experience on the boards of other startups. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Much discussion has taken place in the management literature regarding the question 
of whether slack resources are beneficial or detrimental to the success of a finn (e.g" 
Bourgeois, 198 J; Cheng & Kesner, 1997; Cyert & March, I 963!l 992; Singh. 1986). Our 
work aimed to demonstrate the importance of slack resources in a different context. In 
short. we would like to reiterate that recognizing the effect of slack resources on IPO finn 
valuation is not only theoretically important but also practically significant. Our flndings 
show that financial, managerial, und innovational slack provides signals to investors about 
the quality of the firlll and its future performance potential. 
REFERENCES 
AkcrJof. G.A. (1(70). The market for "lemon"''': Quality uncertainty and the market mechanbm. Quarter!:",' 
Journal (~f Economics. 84(3). 4Sg-500, 
Amit. R, & Schot.'mak.:-l'. PJ.H. (199.1L Strategic as\cts and organi/ationai fent. ,)'lrategic Mallag!'mem 
Journal. f.!( 1).33-46, 
Ar~nd. R.J. (200) J. A dyad-based analysis of 11t\V venture succ-cs..,: Comparing reccnt internet and non~int('rnet 
related IPOs, J{wrnal (~f Prirale EquiIy, 59{\VintcrL 59-7 r. 
Arthurf-. J.D.• BU9..>nitl, L.\V., Ho<.;kisson. R.E.• & Johnson. R.A. (2009). Signaling ami initial public offering:.: 
The use and impact of the: lockup period. Journal of Busincss Venturing. 24. 360<H2, 
A\hton. \V.B. & SI?Il, R,K. (19gb). U~ing patent inform:uion in technology business planning. Res{'ardl 
</cdm%gl' Alanagemem. 3/(6). 42--46. 
Barry. CB" Muscarella. cr, Peavy. l.W.1., &. Vctsuypens. M.I<. (1990). The role of venture capital in the 
creation of public companic!'.: EvidltflCe fronl the gojng~public pwccss. Journal (?f Fimmdal Enmomk\, 
27(21.447-471. 
Beau)'. R.P, t 1(89). /\uditor rcputation and the pricing of initial public offerings. Accounting R.n,-jew, ()4(.1-). 
69,1~709. 
Be-Litty. R.P. & Ritter. 1.R. {19g6). Investment hanking, rcpm3fit)l1. and the underpricing of initial puhlic 
Offerings. JoltJ'JIal t~l Financial Economics. 15( 1/2), 213-232. 
Beatty. R.P. & Zajac. EJ. (l994). Managerial inr..:clllives. monitoring, and ri:;k bearing: A study of executive 
compensation, owner~hip, :ind board structure in initial public offcring:-.. AdmilliHralil-(' Scicnce Quane)'!.\,. 
3YC2L 313~335. 
Booth . .l.R. & Smith. RL. II (1986). Capital raising. underwriting. ami {he ~ertilh.. ation hypothesis. Juurnal 
(~rFil1(/lIcilil Ecmwmics. 15(lflJ. 261~28i. 
8ourgeuis. Ll, III, (1931). On the mC;l\UI'cmcnl of nrgani/ational :-.Iark. Academy (~r Afmu(1j!'mCIif NericH'. 
6( I 1. 2V~39o 
Bourgcni<;,. LJ.• II) & Singh. J,V. (l9g3). Or;:ani::miolla{ Slack and Political Behm'ior Among J(Jp ;\ftUwgc~ 
mem Teams, P~ipcr presented Gl the At:adcmy of Management Pn}('ccdings, 
Brau. J.e.. Brown, R,A .• & Ostcryoung. J. {20U4-). Dl) venture capitalists add value to small manut~iCtllring 
finns? An empirkal ::maly:-.is of v(,flHm: and nOf1¥vcnture ('apit:Jl~hack('d initial puhlic offering~ Journal (~f 
Smallthoif/c).\' Afanagcfllell!. ·12. 78-92. 
1141 
Brau, j.c, & Fawcett, S.E. (2006). Initial public offerings: An analysis of theory and practice. lOll/'llal of 
Fillallce, 6/(1), 399-436. 
Brav, A. & Gompers. P,A. (2003). The role of lockups in initial public offerings. Review ofFinancial Studies, 
16(1), 1-29. 
Brealey. R. & ~1ycrs. S. (1996). Principii,s oj corporate finance, Nev.' York: McGraw-HilL 
Bromilcy. P. (I9YI). Tesling a c~iusal model of corporate risk taking ano. pcrfonnnl1ce. Academy of 
Afallagement Journal, 3";'( 1), 37-59, 
Carpenter, M.A., Sanders, \V.G" & Gregc!'>en, B.B. t 200 I). Bundling human capital with organizational 
context: The impact of intemational assignment experience on ITIultinationall1nn performance and CEO pay. 
Academy (~r Management Journal, ..1-1(3), 493-51 L 
Carpenter. R.E. & Pcter".cn. B.C. (2002), Capital market imperfections. high-tech investment. and new equity 
linancing. EcoJ/omic Journal, /J2C~-77), F54, 
Carter, R. & Mana~ter, S, (}<)<)O). [nilial public offerings and underwriter reputation, Journal of Finance. 
·1514), 1045-1067. 
Carter, R.B,. Dark, EI-L & Singh, A.K. (19tJ8a). Board, (~rdire('tors: S'i::e alld composition and the ([fCCI Oil 
lPOs, \Vorking paper, Iowa StatL' University. 
Carter, R.B., Dark, F.rI.. & Singh. A.K. 11998b). Underwriter repnwtlOll, initial returns, and the long-run 
performance of IPO \tock~, Journal (~r Finance. 53( I). 285-311. 
Castanias, R,P, & Helf31. c.E. (1991). Managerial re~oun..:cs and rents. Journal of ~1allag('mi'1Il, J70), 
155-171. 
Ceno. ST. (2003), Influcncing initial public offering invt\tors with prl,.~stjgc: Signaling with board structures. 
Academy olMal1agemcflr Rn'icH'. 28(3), 432-i46. 
Ce110, ST" Covin, j.G.. Daily. CM.. & Dalton. D.R. ,20tll). Wealth and the effects of founder management 
among IPO-!"-ItJge new venture\. Slroregic All11wgemenf Journal, 22(617). 641--658. 
Certo. S:r.. Daily, C.1\'1.. & Dalton. D.R. (2001). Signaling finn value through board structure: An in\'estiga~ 
lion of initial public offerings. Emrt.'prclIcurship Theory and Practic(" 20C2:). 33-50. 
Certo, S.L Holcomb, T.R.. & Holmes, R.M. (2009). A synthesis of IPa research in management and 
entreprcnl~urship: Moving the agcnda fonvnrd. Journal (~r,tI(lJ/agon(,lll. 35(6), 1340-1378. 
Chakravanhy, B,S. (1986).lV1easliring strategic perfonnancc. Stralegh' AIanagemem Journal, 7(5),437-458. 
Chauvin. K.\V. & Hir;;chey, M. (1993). Advertising. R&D expenditures and the market value of the tirm. 
Financial Management, 22(4)' 128-140, 
Cheng. J.L.c' & Kesner. I.E (19971. Organizational slack and response to environmental shifts: The- impact 
of resource allocation pattern~> Journal (~( Alallt/gemclll. 23( 1), 1-18. 
Comanor. \V.S, (1965), Research and technical change in the pharmaceutical industry, The /?crif..'w {~r 
Economics and Statistics • ..f7, 182-190, 
Cryer. J.D. & .t\'Iiller, R, (l991), Statfstics for busillt'ss: Data onalnis alld mot/cling, Boston: P\VS-Kent. 
Cyert. R.M. & March, j.G. (196311992). A bcharioralthemT olthe firill. Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prentice-HalL 
Daily, C.M,. Certo. S.T.. & Dalton. D,R. (2005). Investment bankers ;md IPO prking; Does prospeclus 
information matter? Journal uf Bwinl'ss Venturing. 20( 11. 93-111. 
1142 
Daily, eM" Ccrto, S.T., Dalton, D.R" & Rocngpitya, R. (200:l). Iro underpricing: A mew·analysis and 
research synthesis. £lIIrcpreueurship Theory and Practice, 27(3), 271-295. 
DeCarolis, D.M, & Deeos, D.L. (1999). The impact of stocks and flows of organizational knowledge on firm 
performance: An empirical investigation of the biotechnology industry. Strategic A1all11geml'1ll Journal, 20. 
953-968. 
Deeds, D.L DeCarolis, l)" & Coombs, J.E. (1997). The impact of firm.specific capabilities on the amollnt 
of capital raised in an initial pubJic offering: Evidence from the biotechnology industry. Journal afBusiness 
\'t~JwlriJlg. J2( I ), 31-46. 
Deeds. D.L., D<!Carolis, D.. &, Coombs, J.E. (1998), Firm~s~dHc rcsoun:cs and wealth creation in 
high~tcchnology ventures: Evidence from newly public biotechnology linns. Entrepreneurship TheOf)' am/ 
PraCliC(', 22(3). 55-56. 
Deed.." D,L, Mang, P.Y., & Frands(.·n. M.L f2(04), 'D1C inf1uenL:e of linn,,' and industric~' Icgitirnacy 1.)11 the 
How of capital into high-technology vcntLln:~S. Sfj'((/cgic Orgoni:atioJl. 2( I), 9~3-t 
Doukas. J. & Switzer. L. (1992). The stock markel's valuation of R&D spending and market t:oncc-ntralion. 
Journal of Economics lind fJuVillf!5S. ·14(2). 95-1 1",1. 
Downes. I),H. & Ikinkel, R. (1982), Signaling and the "'lluation of unsea:-.oned new issues. joumal (if 
Fill(lI/('(', 37(1), 1-10. 
Dyke. L.S., Fischer, E.M.• & Reuber. A.H.. (l(92). An inter-indus(1)' examination of the impact of O\vner 
experience on linn pe-rformance. Journal (~f Small Business AJanagemcl1t, 30(4), 72-88. 
EtHic, lE, (19l)S). R&D and global nlanllt~IClurjng performance. /vlallugemenl 5;ciel/ce, 44( I), 1-11. 
Filatotchev, I. & BishOp, K. (2()02). Board composition, share ownership, and "underpricing" of U.K. IPO 
linll~, Strate}:ic A4wwgemem Journal. 23( 10). 941. 
Finkelstein, S. & Hambrick, D.c:. (1996). Strategic leadership. St. Paul. MN: West Publishing Co. 
Finkle. T.A. (1998), The relationship Octween hn;1rd~ of direcwrs an initial public offerings in the bi()H~ch­
nology industry_ Entrepreneurship 11U'0l)' and Practice. 22(3), 5-29, 
Hscher. H.M. & Pollock, T.G. 1201M), Effects of socia! capital and power on surviving transformational 
change: The t'"ase or initial public offerings. Acadctn), of iHanagemcnf Jourual. 47t4 i. 463-4R I. 
George. G. (20051. Slack resources nnd lilt' performance of privately held !inns. Academy (~r Afunagcl!lent 
Journal. ·18(4). 661 -676. 
('rahowski. H. & Vernon. J. (1990), A new look at the returns and risks to pharmacelltical R&D. Mal/(/gemcflI 
Sdl'lwc, 36, 804-821. 
Grady, M.f., ;,k"mder, 1.1.. Manin, D.L., & Merges, R.P. (1992). Patent law and 'ent dissipation; Com men· 
[ark,s, Vj;:~illr'a LOB' i?cl'iew. 78, 305~38I. 
Graves. S.B. & L.-angowitL. N.S. (1993), lnnovativr: productivity and return", to St'ale in the pilmmacemil"al 
industry. Strategic kfanagcmcn/ Jownal. 1·1-(8J. 593~605. 
Greenley. G.E. & OktemgiL tvL (19gB). A comparis.on of slack n.~'ouj'(:('," in high and 1m,,: performing Britbh 
~ompanies. Journal (~f ,fI"ltlllagemelll Studies, 350), 377-39~t 
Grc\'t', H.R, (2(03). A behavioral theory of R&D expendilur('~ and innovallons: E\ idence from shipbuilding. 
A(>adnny oj ;'*.fllnagemeilf Journal. 46(6), 685-702. 
1143 
Gulati, R. & Higgins, M.e. (2003). \Vhich ties matter when? The contingent effects of interorganizational 
partnerships on IPQ success. StraTegic MUllogemelll Journal, 24(2), 127-144. 
Hambrick. D.C. (1982). Environmental \canning and organizational str~ltegy. Strategic Management Journal. 
3(2), 159-174, 
Harris, D, & Helrat, C (1997), Specilicity or CEO human capital and compensation, STraTegic Management 
Journal, (19M-199R), IS( 11),895-920, 
I·liggins. M.e. & Oulad. R. (2006). Stacking the deck: The effeCb of lOp management backgrounds on 
investor decisions. Strategic Management Journal, 27{ I). 244<263. 
Ibbotson, R,G, & Jaffe, J.F. (1975), Hot issue Imrkets, Journal of Fillance, 30(4), 1027-1042, 
Ibbot-;on. R.G., Sindelar. J.t., &. Ritter, lR (1988). Initial public offl"ring~. Jourllal (?f'Applird Corporate 
Finance. 1.3].-45. 
Janney, J.J. & Folta. T.B. (:2003). Signaling through private equity placements and its impact on the valuation 
of biotechnology firms. Journal (!l/Jusiness' \'£'Iliuring, 18(3), 361-380. 
Jelinek. M. & Schoonho\'en, CB. (1990). Thl' il/nol'm/uJ/ ml1rm/JOJL Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell. Ltd. 
Jenscn, j'v1.C, (19t)3,. The modem industrial rCYollHion, exit. and the failure of internal control system~. 
Journal of Financ!!, 48(3). 831-8g0. 
Kennedy. p, (1992). A gwde to enmometricL Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. 
Khllr~hcd. A. (2000). Discussion of Joel) the presence of v('nlure capitalisb improve the survival profile of IPO 
lirms'? Journal of Busifless Finance & Accounting, 27c91l0). 1177-1 nD. 
Kor. Y,Y. (2003). Expcrjence~hased lOp management tcam compdenl..'e and sllstained grO\vth. Olglll/!::.alioll 
ScieTicc. J./(6), 707-719, 
Kor, Y.Y. (2006). Direct and intera\'>tion effects of top management team and hoanl compo\itions on R&D 
investment strategy. Stratl'Ric Managemc11I Journal. 27( 11), 1081-1099. 
Kor, Y.Y. & Mahoney. J.T (2000). Penrose's resour\:c-based approach: The process and product of research 
creativity. }oumal (~r A4mw/.:emel1t Studies, 37( 1). 109-138_ 
Kraat!. M,S. & Zajac. EJ. (200 I). How organizational resources affect strategic change and performance in 
turbulent environments: Theory and evidence, Or;:ani::atioll .S'cicllcc. 12(5),632-657. 
Latham, S.F. & Braun, I\tR. (2008). The performance implication\- or financial sla~k during economic 
recession and recovery: Observations from the software industry (2001-2003). Journal ofAIan age rial Issues. 
20( 11, .10-50. 
Leibcnstein, H. (19(6). Allocative efficiency \'ersu:. crticiency. American F;coflomic i?(Tit'lI', 56.392--1-15, 
Leibcn'itein, H. (llJ69). Organi/ationaJ or {'ridional equilibria. X~effkiency. and the rate of innovation. 
Quarterly Journal (~r E~C()l1mllic.\. 83{4l. 600-62.1. 
Lester. R,H" Ccrtn. S,T., Dalton. eM" Dalton, [l,R" 8,: Cannella. A),A, (2006), Initial public offering 
investor valuations: An examination of top management team prestige and environmental uncertainly. Journal 
ofS11Iall BIl.\'iness ;\4(ff1agt'l1lol1. 44{!), 1-26. 
Lev. B. (J969L InduSlf) a\'~rage~ as targets for financial ratio..,. JOllrnal o{Accormlillg Research. 7. 290-299. 
Lin, T.H. (1996), The cenilication role of large block shareholder.; in initial public offerings: The case of 
venture capitalist". Quarter!.\, Journal (~lBus/l1e.\s aI/(/ Economic.\, 35(2). 55----05. 
1144 
Long. C. (20(2). Patent signals. Unit'efSi{)' ofChicago Law Rel'i(!H', 69, 625-679. 
Loughran. T. & Ritter. J. (2004). \Vhy has IPO underpricing changed over time'? Financial Management. 
33(3). 5,~37. 
Macgregor. D.O., SJovic. P .. Drcman. D .. & Berry. P. (lOOO). Imagery, affect, and HnanciaJ judgment. journal 
0{ P<Iyclwlogy a"d Financial Mark<'1s, J, I()4()~ I J J O. 
Macmillall. I.e.. Kulow. D.M.. & Kllo),l;an, R. (1989). Venture capitalists' ;nvolvemcnt in their imestments: 
Extent and performance. Journal (?f Busilu'ss Venturing, ./(l). 27-47. 
Mahoney. J.T. (1995). ''11H.'' management of resources and the resource of management. Journal of Businf'ss 
Nescarefl. 33(2), 91-101. 
Mahoney. 1.1'. & Pandian. l.R. (992). The resource-hased view within the coO\\:r:-,ation of :-.tratcgic man~ 
agement. Strategic ;limwgement Journal (liJ86-1998,. 13(5). 363~3XO, 
Malcv.-icki, D, & Sivakumar. K. (2004). Patents and product Jevc!opmcnt \trategics: A model of antecedent" 
and consequences of patent value. European Journal of IIllWl'atioll A4anuj!ctllcllf. ;, 5-"2:2. 
March. J.G. & Shapinl, Z. (19871. Managerial perspective:.- on risk and ri"k taking. Manugemo/t Science, 
33(1 I). 1~()4-1·!18. 
McBain, M.L. & Krause, D,S. (1989). Going public: The impact of insiders' holdings on the price of initial 
public offerings, Journal (~[ Business Venturing. 4(6). 419-42S. 
:v1cgginson, \V.L. & \Vch):-., K.t\. (1991 J. Venture cnpilalbt ccnificati()fl in initial public orfering~. Joamal of 
Finance, ·16(3), 879-903. 
Michael" R. & Shaw, W.H. (1994). The pricing of initiai public offerings: Tc,ts of adverse-seiection and 
signaling theories, Ret'iew of Financial Stutiies. 7(2), 279-319. 
Mikkelson. W.IL Partch, M.M.. & Shah. K. (1997). Owner,hip and operating performance oi'companics that 
go puhlic. Journal of Financial Economics. oJ4(J). 2gl~307. 
Miller, J).. Lant, T., Milliken, F" & Korn, H. 11996). The evolUlion of strategic simplicity: Exploring two 
models of organi/ational adoption. jourlial of fHallogemcnt. 22. S63~8S7. 
Miller. K.D. & Lcibldn. MJ. (1996), CorpunHc risk-return rdation~: Return" variability vcr~u" dnv.-n,idc 
risk. Acat/emy (~r AfmwgemcllI Journal, 39( 1).91-122. 
tvfishinn. Y .• Pollock. TeG., & Pural:. J.F. (2Q()4). Arc more rCSOllfC<:S always bt:ttt:r for growth? Resource 
:-.tkkincss in market anu product expansion. ,)'trategic Afalltlgement Jourtfal. 25( 12), t 179,- i 197. 
Mo~es. O.D. (1992l. Orgunil:llional slack and rish-laking behaviour: Tc\t~ of ph'lduct prking strategy. 
Journal (~r 0n:alli;:a;imwl Change A1ollagctnctll. 5(3). 38-5.+. 
Muuambi. R. & Zimmerman. T.ivL (20(5). Cash crisi\ in newly public Int('rnet~hased linll'.: An empirical 
analysis. Journal (!{ Bus-lnes'>' H'll!uting. 20. 543~57 J. 
Ndofor. H.A & Lcvitas. E, C200,JI. Signaling the strategic value of knOWledge. Jmona! Id Managemcm. 
30(S), 6gS-702. 
Ncl"on, T. (2003,). Th~ p;;;rsistcncc: of founder inlluence: Management. O\\'lh..'rship. and perform~ml~e df..:cts at 
initiai pubtk' offering. 5,"lnJlegic Afanagemem Journal. 2.J{S), 707-72~L 
Ncter. J.. \Vasscnmm. \V., & Kutner, M.H. (1985). Applied linear SftllLHical models: Rcgre,\sioJ'i ano!.'rs;'., or 
\'arhl!!('{', anti c.\periulI!l1!al deslgn. Homewood. IL: Richard D. Invll1. 
1145 
Nohria, N, & Gulati, R, (1995), What is the optimum amount of organizational slack? A study of the 
relationship between slack and innovation in multinational firms. Academy of Mal1agemel11 Journal Best 
Papers Proceedings 1995, 32-36. 
Nohria, N, & Gulati, R, (1996), Is slack good or bad for innovation'? Academy 'ifManagement Journal, 39(5), 
1245-1264. 
Palmer, T.B. & Wiseman, R,M. (1999), Decoupling risk taking from income stream uncertainty: A holistic 
model of risk. Slrategic AJunagemelll Journal. 20. 1037-1062. 
Penrose. E. (l959). The tileory (~f (he gmh'rh oj lire firm. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Pollock, T,G" Chen, G" Jackson, E.M" & Hambrick, D,C, (2010), How much prestige is enough? A"essing 
the value of multiple types of high-status affiliates for young i1nn'i, journal of Business Venturing. 25( 1). 
6-23. 
Prahalad, C.K. & Bettis. R.A. (1 ~86). The dominanl logic: A new linkage between diversity and performance. 
cS'trlllegic A1(/Il<lgemellt Joimw/, 7{6 j, 48),--50 I. 
Price\VaterhollSC. (1995). nIl:' goi1lg public /umdbook. New York: Author. 
Purnanandam. A.K. & Swaminathan, B. (2004). Arc IPOs n~al1y underpriced'! Rel'iell" of Financial S'wdies, 
17,811-84K 
Reed, R" Lcmak, D,L & Hesser. w'A, (l997), Cleaning-up after the Cold War: Management and social 
issues. /-\t'ac!emy of Management Rc\'le\f. 22. 61.+-642. 
ReitLig, M. (2004). Improving patent valuations for management purpo:-,cs: Validating new indicators by 
analysing: application rationales. Research Policy, 33, 939-957. 
Ritter, j,R, I I<]x'!), The "hot i"ue" markel of 1980, JO//rl/al 0/ H//sillfSS, 571lJ. 215-240, 
Ritter, l.R. (1998). Initial public offerings. Conremportll~r Finance Digest. 2, 5-30. 
Sanders, VV.G. & Boivie, S. (2004). Sorting things out: Valuation Df new Jirms in uncertain markets. ,<;lratcgic 
/J;/unagemenl JOllmal, 25(2:), 167-186. 
Scherer, F.ivt ( 19XO). flldustrial markct slrucllfre and ecoflomit" !u',lormullce. Bo<.,ton: Houghton~Mimin. 
Simon, B.A. (1957). AdminiHratire /u:/wl'for. New York: Free Pn.>~s. 
Singh, J.v. (l986). PerfOlTI1anCC, slack. and ri~k taking in organilational decision making. Academy l{ 
A-1anagt?11lfnt JOllma/, 29(.3), 562-5R5. 
Somaya, D. (2003). Strategic determinants of decisions not to settle pat~nllitigations. Slralegic ;\1anagement 
Journal. 24, 17-3fL 
Spence. M. (1973). Job market signaling. Quarter/v Journal of Economics. 87{3}, 355-374. 
Spender. le. (19X9), Indu\'try recipes: The Nature (lmi \olIrn<~ of nUI1U1.~l'r;al Judgmenr. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
Staw, H.M .. Sandelands, L.E., & Dutton, J.E. (ltJiO). Thrcat~rigidity effects 111 organizational behavior: 
A multikvel analysis. Adminisrralive Snc/U'c Quarterly. 26(4), 501-,52A. 
Storrud-Barnes. S.F.. Reed. R., & Jessup, L.M. 12(10). Uncertainty. risk preference. ami new-venture :-.tral­
cgies. Journal of ,)'tratcgy and Atuflagcmelll. 3. 273<?:84. 
1146 
Sluan, T. & Sorenson, O. (2003). The gcogmphy of opportunity: Spatial heterogeneity in fOllnding rates and 
the performance of biotechnology firl1l~. Research Policy. 32. 229-253. 
Slllart. T.E.. Hoang. H., & Bybel', R.C. (1999). Imerorganizalional endorsements "'ld the performance of 
entrepreneurial ventures. A<iminislrath'c Sdence QUllrlCri):. 44(2), 3 J5-349. 
Tan. J. & Pengo M,\V. (2003). Organizational slack and firm performance during economic tran~ition::.: ~f\vo 
studies from an emerging economy. Su'alexic Managcm('m lour/wI. 2-1(3). J 249-1263. 
'lcoh. S.H.. \Vclcll, I., & \Vong. TJ. (1998). Ealllings management and the long-nm market performance of 
initial puillic offerings. loumal oIFinance. 53(6), 1935-1974. 
Titman. S. & Trueman. B. (1986). information {juality and the valuation of new issues. Journal (~ri\cc(i!m{jng 
(Jmi Economics. 8(2). 159-172. 
Van de Ven. A.I-I .. Hudson. R., & St.:hrocder. D.fvt (1984). Designing new business ::,tartup~: Entrepreneuriai. 
organi73tinnal, and ecological considerations. Journal (~r Jftlluzgelllt'lu, 10{ I). 'i)7~ 108. 
Van del' Ecrden, C. & Saelens. F.H. {1991 ,. The lbC of st'iena and technnJog~y indicators. in strategic planning. 
Long Range Planning, 2,/(3}. 18-25. 
Voss. G.I3.. SirJeshmukh. D.. & Yo", Z.G. (200R). The e1fec!s of 'lack resources and environmental threat on 
product exploration and exploitation. Academy (~r Mal!agemem lounwl. 51( I), 147-164. 
\Vdbollrne. T.M. & Andrews. A.O. (1996), Predicting the pcrfnmmm.'c of initial public offering'): Should 
human resource management be in the equation'? Academy (~f Managemcw Journal" 3W4). 891-919. 
\Viscman. R.M. & Bromiky. p, 0(96). Toward a tnl.,yJcl of risk in declining organizations.: /\n empirical 
examination of risk performance and dedine. (h:r;oni::.atioll Science, 7(:)),524-543. 
\Vright. [\-1., Robbie, K., 8:.. Enncw. C, t 19(7). Venture- capitalist:-; and ::.crial ¢mrcprencurs. Journal (~rBll"iJle<H 
,"'mllring. 12(3),227-249. 
Zimmerman. M.A. (200g). Tht~ influence of lOp management team heterogeneity on the capital raised through 
an initial public offering. 1::mrepreJleurship Theory and Practice. 32(3). 39I---41"L 
1 i47 
